A Generalized Publication Bias Model

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Scargle (2000) has discussed Rosenthal and Rubin's (1978) fail-safe number" (FSN) method for estimating the number of unpublished studies in meta-analysis. He concluded that this FSN cannot possibly be correct because a central assumption the authors used conflicts with the very definition of publication bias. While this point has been made by others before (Darlington, 1980; Elsahoff, 1978; Iyengar & Greenhouse, 1988; Thomas, 1985), Scargle showed, by way of a simple 2-parameter model, how far off Rosenthal and Rubin's estimate can be in practice. However, his results relied on the assumption that the decision variable is normally distributed with zero mean. In this case the ratio of unpublished to published papers is large only in a tiny region of the parameter plane. Building on these results, we now show that (1) replacing densities with probability masses greatly simplifies Scargle's derivations and permits an explicit statement of the relation between the probability α of Type I errors and the step-size β ; (2) this result does not require any distribution assumptions; (3) the distinction between 1-sided and 2-sided rejection regions becomes immaterial; (4) this distribution-free approach leads to an immediate generalization to partitions involving more than two intervals, and thus covers more general selection functions.

Keywords: publication bias, meta-analysis, file-drawer hypothesis, fail-safe number

Historical Context

In the late 70's, Rosenthal and Rubin (1978) and Rosenthal (1979) proposed a new method for coping with the nagging "file-drawer problem" of meta-analysis. In essence, meta-analysis is a quantitative method for aggregating statistical results of a number of similar studies on a particular topic into

a hopefully more conclusive larger study, relying on methods proposed by Wallis (1942), Fisher (1948), and others. These procedures are statistically sound as long as the necessary assumptions - most importantly the fairness of the samples - are met at least approximately. Problems arise when they are not met, as in meta-analysis, a supposedly more objective method for evaluating accumulated

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research.

Mahoney (1977) has defined "confirmatory bias" as "the tendency to emphasize and believe experiences which support one's views or discredit those which do not" (p. 161). This type of bias has been repeatedly verified and seems to be pervasive and quite robust. After asking 75 journal reviewers "to referee manuscripts which described identical experimental procedures but which reported positive, negative, mixed or no results", he not only found poor inter-rater agreement, but also, more to the point here, that "reviewers were strongly biased against manuscripts which reported results contrary to their theoretical perspective" (loc. cit.)

In an effort to cope with this challenge, Rosenthal and Rubin (1978) proposed a so-called "fail-safe number" (FSN) approach intended to estimate post hoc the number of unpublished papers that languish in file-drawers because they had been rejected as a result of confirmatory bias. The implied claim was that a positive effect in the published sample could only be due to publication bias if there were at least this number of unpublished papers. Typically, this FSN turned out to be very large. For example, in the first paper published on this topic in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS), Rosenthal and Rubin (1978) reported a FSN of 65,122 for 345 published studies. The authors concluded that "It certainly seems unlikely that there are file drawers crammed with the unpublished results of over 65,000 studies of interpersonal expectations" (p. 381).

One of the commentators, Elsahoff (1978), presented a simple counterexample in the same issue that suggested the FSN logic had to be flawed, since Rosenthal and Rubin's FSN appeared to be far too large. One year later, Rosenthal (1979) restated this FSN argument in the more widely read *Psychological Bulletin*. This paper spawned

a veritable avalanche of meta-analytic literature reviews, which continues unabated to this day, and which is predicated on the mistaken belief that Rosenthal and Rubin had banished the confirmatory publication bias problem once and for all.

Barely one year after Rosenthal's paper had appeared, Darlington¹ submitted a manuscript to the *Bulletin* challenging Rosenthal and Rubin's reasoning with the following simple counterargument: "... imagine that all the test null hypotheses in a certain area are true, and that the only results published are the 5% of studies which achieve significance by chance. Suppose that 345 studies were published this way (The number 345 is used to facilitate later comparison with the Rosenthal-Rubin example.) Then we are imagining that the total number of studies performed was T = 20x345 or 6900" (loc. cit. p.3) - not 65, 467, as Rosenthal and Rubin had reported.

Darlington also furnished a plausible explanation for the discrepancy between his and Rosenthal and Rubin's findings. Rosenthal and Rubin had simply made a mistake: "The specific statistical assumption Rosenthal adopted is inconsistent with the problem he purported to solve ... Rosenthal's formulation assumed that the mean Z of the unpublished studies would be zero. But if all the most significant studies were published, and if the mean Z of all studies (published and unpublished) were zero, then the mean of the unpublished studies would be negative" (loc. cit.). Although at least one referee had encouraged the editor to publish Darlington's paper, the Bulletin editor ended up rejecting it on the advice of other reviewers.

Unaware of Darlington's precedent, a second author, Thomas², submitted a very similar critique to the *Psychological Bulletin* "... the distribution of Z scores, conditioned on their appearing in the

Darlington, R. (1980). Another peek at the file drawer. Submitted 7/25/1980 to the *Psychological Bulletin*. Rejected 10/27/1981. Personal communication. Letters available from first author upon request.

Thomas, H. (1985). On the "File Drawer" problem. Submitted 1/14/1985 to the *Psychological Bulletin*. Rejected 3/8/1988. Personal communication. Letters available from first author upon request.

literature, cannot be standard normal in distribution [but rather a] truncated distribution of the original test statistic distribution" (Abstract, p.2). Thomas, too, was unable to convince the new *Bulletin* editor of the validity of this simple argument. After encouraging him to revise his manuscript several times, the *Bulletin* ended up rejecting it after almost five years of protracted review.

A whole decade elapsed since Rosenthal and Rubin's introduction of their FSN method before Iyengar and Greenhouse (1988) finally managed to straighten out the public record. Starting out with fulsome praise for "Rosenthal's fail-safe sample size approach [as] an elegant formulation," they eventually noted "several drawbacks that limit its usefulness" (p.115). One of them was that Rosenthal (1979) "assumes that the mean Z value for the unpublished studies is zero ... Now, if there were publication bias in favor of studies with statistically significant findings, the Z values would not be a sample from a standard normal distribution" (p.111). This was precisely the point that both Darlington and Thomas had vainly tried to register ten years

earlier.

As an alternative to the FSN approach, Iyengar and Greenhouse proposed fitting a selection function accommodate the bias. As they acknowledge, such a procedure vitiates the main selling point of Rosenthal and Rubin's FSN method, its computational simplicity: "The maximum likelihood approach based on selection models does involve much more computation" (Iyengar & Greenhouse, 1988, p.115).

Scargle (2000) expanded on their model. Specifically, he investigated the assumption that publication bias is a function only of a single variable, the reported z-score summarizing the study. The quantitative model he adopted was a 2-parameter step-function for the publication probability:

$$S(z) = Prob(publication) = \beta, if z < z_0,$$

 $S(z) = 1, if z = z_0.$ (1)

The publication probability as a function of z is found by multiplying the selection function S(z)

Table 1 $r := f/p$ for selected values of α and β											
	β	0.01	0.05	0.1	0.15	0.2	0.25	0.3	0.35	0.4	0.45
	1-β	0.99	0.95	0.9	0.85	0.8	0.75	0.7	0.65	0.6	0.55
α	1-α										
0.01	0.99	49.25	15.81	8.17	5.31	3.81	2.88	2.26	1.81	1.46	1.2
0.02	0.98	32.56	13.49	7.47	4.99	3.63	2.77	2.18	1.75	1.43	1.17
0.03	0.97	24.19	11.74	6.87	4.7	3.46	2.67	2.12	1.71	1.39	1.14
0.04	0.96	19.16	10.36	6.35	4.43	3.31	2.57	2.05	1.66	1.36	1.12
0.05	0.95	15.81	9.26	5.9	4.19	3.17	2.48	1.99	1.61	1.33	1.09
0.1	0.9	8.17	5.9	4.26	3.26	2.57	2.08	1.7	1.41	1.17	0.98
0.15	0.85	5.31	4.19	3.26	2.6	2.13	1.76	1.47	1.23	1.04	0.88
0.2	0.8	3.81	3.17	2.57	2.13	1.78	1.5	1.27	1.08	0.92	0.79
0.25	0.75	2.88	2.48	2.08	1.76	1.5	1.29	1.11	0.95	0.82	0.7
0.3	0.7	2.26	1.99	1.7	1.47	1.27	1.11	0.96	0.83	0.72	0.63
0.35	0.65	1.81	1.61	1.41	1.23	1.08	0.95	0.83	0.73	0.64	0.56
0.4	0.6	1.46	1.33	1.17	1.04	0.92	0.82	0.72	0.64	0.56	0.49
0.45	0.65	1.2	1.09	0.98	0.88	0.79	0.7	0.63	0.56	0.49	0.43
0.5	0.5	0.98	0.9	0.82	0.74	0.67	0.6	0.54	0.48	0.43	0.38

discussed above by the probability distribution of the reported z values themselves, denoted here g(z). For example, the null hypothesis might be that g(z) is a zero-mean normal distribution. On defining

p: = probability that a paper will be published, the ratio (2)

$$(1-p)/p := r \tag{3}$$

plays a central role in Scargle's argument. He found that r is large only for a tiny region of the (z, β) plane (Fig. 3 of Scargle, 2000, with different notation. See also Table 1). This fact undermines the FSN rationale of Rosenthal and Rubin.

To fix terms, let us call r "large" if it exceeds 50, and "very large" if it exceeds 100. Table 1 shows that r is never large for any of the conventional significance levels ($\alpha = .01, .05, .10$), while Rosenthal and Rubin's r = 189 is very large.

We now generalize Scargle's earlier results in two directions. We show (1) that the main result can be obtained without any distribution assumption, and (2) that such a distribution-free approach easily extends to more general selection functions S(z), thereby removing possible concerns that the original 2-parameter family may be too restrictive.

Main Result

For added clarity, we restate the main features of Scargle's step-function selection model in Fig. 1. Beyond a certain cut-off z_0 , all studies are published with probability 1, below this cut-off, they are published with constant probability. Geometrically, β is the step-size of the selection function S(z) in Equation 1. Assuming the density g(z) is normal, Scargle studied the contours of r in a (β, z_0) coordinate system (Fig. 3 in Scargle, 2000). We now show that they can be studied without any assumptions about the shape of g(z).

To begin with, note that for any given density g(z), α serves just as well as z_0 to represent the




Figure 1. Solid line: Scargle's step-function selection function S(z), representing a publication bias that allows all papers to be published above some threshold, but only a fraction β to be published below. Dashed line: a nominal distribution g(z) is superimposed for illustration: the overall publication probability as a function of z is the product of the two curves, and the shaded area above z_0 is the parameter α that we use as a surrogate for z_0 .

location of the step in S(z). We therefore may transform to a more convenient $(1-\alpha, 1-\beta)$ coordinate system. For the sake of simplicity, we treat the 1-tailed case where α is the probability mass under g(z) to the right of z_0 , and β is the constant probability that a paper with $z < z_0$ is published (Fig. 1). Our conclusions apply equally to the two-sided case, where α includes both the upper and lower tails of g(z). This forestalls unnecessary disputes about the 1-tailed versus the 2-tailed case that concerned Rosenthal and Rubin (1988, p.120) versus Iyengar and Greenhouse (1988, p.134).

The total probability that a paper is rejected is then, as a fraction of a fraction,

$$1 - p = (1-\alpha)(1-\beta), \tag{4}$$

and the complementary probability p of publication is

$$p = 1 - (1-\alpha)(1-\beta). \tag{5}$$

Equation 17. in Scargle (2000) is a special case of Equation 5. with g a normal distribution. Here, however, we have made no distribution assumptions at all. To obtain an expression for r in Equation 3, we divide the identity

$$(1-p) = (1-p)/[(1-p) + p]$$
 (6)

by p, arriving at

1 -
$$p = r/(r+1)$$
. (7)

Therefore, for fixed $r = r_0$, one obtains from Equation 4.

1 - p =
$$(1-\beta)(1-\alpha) = r_0/(r_0+1)$$
. (8)

This equation is basic for all further derivations. The contours $r = r_0$ describe a family of rectangular hyperbolae in a $(1-\beta)(1-\alpha)$ coordinate system. Since the range of both variables is restricted to the unit




Figure 2. Plot of In r, the ratio of unpublished to published papers as a function of the probability mass β describing publication bias, for several common "p-values" α .

square, they resemble a family of straight lines with slope -1 (cf. Figure 3). Figure 2 shows a plot of (ln) r as a function of the two parameters α and β . Nowhere in the parameter space covered in Table 1 is r "very large".

Extension to more general selection functions S(z)

From Equation 5 one further finds that

$$p = \beta(1 - \alpha) + 1\alpha, \tag{9}$$

which is just

p=Prob(publish |
$$z \in Q_1$$
) Prob ($z \in Q_1$)+
Prob(publish | $z \in Q_2$) Prob($z \in Q_2$), (10)

where Q_1 , Q_2 partition the real line into two intervals separated by z_0 , and Prob(publish $\mid z \in Q_k$) denotes the conditional probability that a paper is published

if it falls into the partition Q_k under the otherwise unspecified density g.

Equation 10 suggests an immediate generalization to partitions Q_k with more than two intervals and thus to more general selection functions S(z). Let

$$A := [A_1, A_2 \cdots A_m],$$
with $A_k := \text{Prob}(z \in Q_k)$ (11)

be a piecewise constant representation, or approximation, of the density function g, and

$$B := [B_1, B_2, \cdots, B_m],$$
 with $B_k := \text{Prob}(\text{ published} \mid z \in Q_k)$ (12)

be the associated conditional probabilities. Then p is simply the sum

$$p = Prob(published) = \sum_{k} A_k B_k$$

k = 1, ..., m. (13)




Figure 3. The relation between α and β for selected values of r.

As an example, consider

$$A = [.6, .3, .1]$$
 and $B = [.2, .4, .9]$. (14)

Equation 14 defines a J-shaped step-function, where e.g., $B_3 = .9$ reflects the fact that perhaps not even papers reporting highly significant results are published with certainty. For this selection function one finds p = (.6)(.2)+(.3)(.4)+(.1)(.9) = .33, so that r = f/(1-p) = 2.

By choosing m, the number of segments, sufficiently large, one can model any arbitrary selection function to any desired degree of approximation. As an example, consider a discrete approximation to the main diagonal of the unit square,

$$B_k = k/m, Ak = 1/m, k = 1, ..., m.$$
 (15)

For the area under the step-function one finds

$$p = m(m+1)/2m^2$$
, so that
 $f/p = r = (m-1)/(m+1) \to 1 \text{ as } m \to \infty$. (16)

This is reasonable because S in Equation 13 converges on the diagonal of the unit square.

It thus emerges that Scargle's argument is perfectly general and not tied to any particular selection function S(z) that may be viewed as unrealistically restrictive. For example, instead of assuming that studies exceeding the cut-off z_0 are published with probability 1 as in Fig. 1, some may argue it is more realistic to assume they are published with probability .8. This would necessitate the introduction of a third parameter.

Conclusions

The fundamental point at issue here is the validity of meta-analyses that relies on combined statistical summaries culled from a literature subject to an unknown degree of publication bias. Essentially, we contest claims that an estimated lower limit to the number of relevant studies denied publication is typically so large as to be

unreasonable. We go beyond previous authors who have already noted that Rosenthal and Rubin's FSN derivations were flawed, in claiming that even correctly computed FSNs are typically quite modest for a large parameter region of a bias model which, moreover, is no longer tied to the normal distribution. This meets the burden of proof that publication bias can distort metaanalytic results to the point of solely representing false positives. In view of our generalization to partitions to more than 2 intervals, we believe that our model reasonably approximates the nature of publication bias. By showing that such a large class of plausible bias models can explain any putative meta-analytic conclusion, we have cast reasonable doubt that should be heeded, especially in cases of great social importance - e.g., for clinical medical studies of drug efficacy and safety. Scargle (2000) had already been more explicit than previous authors in questioning the legitimacy, not just of the FSN method, but of meta-analysis in general as a justifiable research tool: "Statistical combinations of studies from the literature can be trusted to be unbiased only if there is reason to believe that there are essentially no unpublished studies (almost never the case)." (Scargle, 2000, p. 102). A case in point is the history of the FSN itself, that we reviewed in the Introduction.

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一般性出版偏誤模型

彼得襄納蒙1傑佛瑞史卡構2

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羅森梭和魯賓於1978年提出一個在整合性分析中估計未發表論文數的方法一失敗安全數(FSN),史卡構於2000年時曾經爲文討論過這個方法。他認爲該方法的核心前提與出版偏誤的定義相違背,因此,該方法不可能是正確的。這個論點雖然其他學者也提出過(Darlington, 1980; Elsahoff, 1978; Iyengar & Greenhouse, 1988; Thomas, 1985),不過,史卡構以一個簡單的兩參數模型說明了羅森梭和魯賓的估計在現實情況中可以多離譜。史卡構的結果係建立在決策變項爲一平均數爲零的常態分配這個前提上。在此前提下,未發表和已發表論文數的比例只有在這個參數面的一小塊區域中會是大的。本研究延伸史卡構先前的結果,進一步說明(一)將連續變項的機率密度代以不連續變項的機率密度可以大幅簡化史卡構的推導,使第一類型錯誤的概率 α 和stepsize β 之間的關係可以明確地陳述;(二)這樣的結果並不需要對母群體的次數分佈型態做任何假設;(三)單尾和雙尾拒絕區的差異變得不再重要;(四)這個無母數的方法可以立刻泛推至兩個以上的區間,涵蓋較廣的選擇函數。

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